In The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone, Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach bring together two themes that have been much discussed in recent psychological research. The first theme (evoked by the title of the book) is the degree to which people assume that they know more than they actually do. The second theme (evoked by the subtitle) is the extent to which human thinking is a social rather than an individual activity. The book does a very good job of introducing and illustrating both themes to a lay audience without entering into more technical or controversial issues that are mostly of interest to psychologists and philosophers. Even so, the way in which the authors articulate the two themes of the book is original and challenging. That we are ignorant of how most things work is hardly surprisinghow could we have the time and competence to acquire all that knowledge and why should we want to anyhow? After all, it would be of no practical use.
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"The story of this book," the authors write in the Acknowledgments, "start with the work of Frank Keil." In a famous 2002 article, The
Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: A Illusion of Explanatory Depth,
Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil (2002) reported a series of elegant experiments where they asked participants whether they knew, for instance, how a flush toilet works. Most said they did. Then the participants were asked to actually explain what happens when they flush. The vast majority were stumped. Sure, water flows and then there is this suction flushing away the contents of toilet bowl. But how is the suction actually brought about? Most people had no idea. They were suffering from an "illusion of explanatory depth": a sense of understanding with no actual understanding. Similarly, most people believe they understand a wide range of policy issues. By asking participants who claimed such understanding to provide actual explanations, Sloman and Fernbach have shown that this too, most of the time, is a mere illusion of knowledge (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013 ).
That we are ignorant of how most things work is hardly surprisinghow could we have the time and competence to acquire all that knowledge and why should we want to anyhow? After all, it would be of no practical use.
For what most of us do with a flush toilet, it is enough to know how to operate it, which can be done without understanding how the mechanism works.
Somewhat less intuitively, this also applies to most political knowledge: as political scientists have long noted (see, e.g., Hardin, 2009) , for most of us, whether or not we individually understand political mechanisms has little or no practical impact on our lives, so-at least from a practical selfish point of view-why bother?
What is remarkable is not that we don't know how most things or institutions work, but that we think we know. Sloman and Fernbach vividly illustrate how common it is to fall prey the illusion of knowledge: reading their book made us realize we thought we knew things we plainly didn't and left us feeling rather foolish. Still, how surprising is this ignorance of our own ignorance? Is it a source of significant mistakes not just in odd contexts like participating in an experiment, but also in our daily life? After all, if it doesn't matter whether we know something, then it shouldn't really matter whether we know that we don't know it.
While our illusions of understanding rarely have practical costs for each of us individually, they can carry collective costs. As Sloman and Fernbach suggest, that so many people labor under the illusion that they understand how, say, the healthcare system works, could preclude them from seeking a better understanding, from listening to others who are more knowledgeable, and, more generally, from adopting a better grounded view on the issue.
People may remain misinformed, and support inadequate policies. Even if each individual voice has little impact, their collective weight has a strong influence on politicians' behavior, and hence, indirectly, on everyone's welfare.
In discussing the extent to which we are aware of what we know or don't know, Sloman and Fernbach never talk explicitly of 'metacognition' and leave out much relevant research done under this label. Nicholas Shea and his colleagues (2014), for instance, suggest that metacognition comes in two forms, one implicit that guides most of our cognition, and one explicit that has a social function: to communicate with others the degree of confidence in our beliefs. Similarly, Asher Koriat has shown that the confidence in our opinion correlates better with how consensual they are, than with how accurate they are (2008) . One might also see the illusion of explanatory depth as a form of overconfidence: being overly confident in our ability to explain something. Just as metacognition, overconfidence has been cast as having a social function: to impress and influence others (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; Vullioud, Clément, Scott-Phillips, & Mercier, 2016) , a possibility that the authors merely evoke in passing.
After the four initial chapters on individual knowledge and illusions of knowledge, chapter Five ("Thinking with Our Bodies and the World") and Six ("Thinking with Other People") move the focus to the social character of human thinking by way of 'embodied,' 'situated,' and 'distributed cognition' (the last two notions not being introduced as such-for the sake of simplicity, we assume). To anyone working in cognitive science, these major aspects of human cognition have become quite familiar, but they deserved being introduced to a wider audience. These two chapters do so very well, and the next three chapters on technological, scientific, and political thinking provide
And what is the link between the knowledge illusion and the social character of thought? "Just as people fail to know where their activities end and those of others begin," Sloman and Fernbach write, "people fail to clearly distinguish their knowledge from others. Merely knowing that knowledge is available in the community makes people feel knowledgeable" (p. 123). This, they argue, is what "leads us to overrate our own understanding. Because we live in a community that shares knowledge, each of us individually can fail to distinguish whether knowledge is stored in our own head or in someone else's" (136). In an ingenious experiment illustrating the point, Sloman and Nathaniel Rabb (2016) have shown that simply telling people that scientists know how something works made participants believe they also understood a little bit how it works. On the other hand (and reassuringly), when the scientists were described as stumped, participants did not claim any understanding for themselves. This might help explain why people think they understand, say, how helicopters fly: surely, the engineers who designed them must possess the relevant knowledge and somehow the community share in this knowledge. How satisfactory is such a simple description and explanation of the illusion of knowledge?
Possibly, the clearest form or ignorance of boundaries between one's own knowledge and that of others is the phenomenon of "semantic deference," i.e., the way we implicitly rely on experts in our community to flesh out the content of many of our statements and beliefs. Sloman and Fernbach do not mention semantic deference, which has been primarily investigated by philosophers rather than psychologists. Tyler Burge (1979 Burge ( , 1986 We all quite commonly use concepts in such a deferential way. We entertain beliefs and make statements that have content gaps. We can ignore these gaps because they are filled, so to speak, in other people's mind. Does, however, such semantic deference count as a form of knowledge illusion? It could be argued that, when we defer to experts for the exact content or reference of the concepts we use, we merely ignore our own ignorance rather than attribute to ourselves knowledge that we do Maybe they don't because it seems commonsensical that misattributions of knowledge tend to be self-serving. From a psychological and social science point of view, however, this should not be taken as a given. It is possible, for instance, that historically, not only has women's contribution to scholarly knowledge been ignored or downplayed by men but also that many women have underestimated their own competence and contribution.
In many forms of social interaction with practical goals or material stakes, it is common to monitor each participant's contribution and benefits. Does such monitoring extend to people's contribution to, and benefits from shared knowledge? Knowledge isn't an ordinary commodity.
Unlike material goods, it can often be shared without loss for the communicator and with benefits for all. The use of deferential concepts, for instance, is universal, harms no one, and, on the contrary, contributes to What benefits senders is the influence that they may have on the attitudes and behavior of receivers, whether by truly informing them or by misleading them (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003) . For communication to remain stable in a population over time, there must be means to ensure that it is, on the whole, beneficial to both parties, hence generally reliable, hence less beneficial to senders than it would be if they could freely not just inform but also deceive. One common explanation of the extraordinary success of communication among humans notwithstanding the deleterious effects that deception might have is that humans are essentially truthful and trusting. And why should this be the case? Either because God made them so, as famously argued by the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, or because natural selection made them so, which has often been claimed, but, in our opinion, has never been properly argued, and is implausible.
Sloman and Fernbach acknowledge that the reliability of communicators cannot be taken for granted but they seem to think that the problem is easily resolved: "we try to surround ourselves with people who report only what they know, and tell us if they're not sure. And we mostly succeed. We can almost always trust the people we interact with; that's what makes community living possible" (p. 260-1). This picture, we believe, is too rosy. Humans do not trust one another in this simple way. Rather, as we and our collaborators have argued, humans are equipped with a set of cognitive mechanisms whose function is to evaluate both communicators and messages and to exercise some epistemic vigilance (not to be confused with systematic distrust) (Mercier, in press; Sperber et al., 2010) . Communicators Receivers impose costs on communicators whose commitments appear unreliable-who failed to hold to their promises, made statements that turned out to be false, or provided poor advice. These costs may occasionally take the form of direct punishment but, much more generally, they are reputational: not living up to one's communicative commitments leads to loss of reputation, with a cascade of detrimental effects. This crucial role of reputation in cooperation has been highlighted in some recent work on morality, for instance Baumard et al. (2013) and Tomasello's Natural History of Morality (2016) . We suggest this work extends naturally to norms of communicative interaction.
To enhance their reputation and not jeopardize it, communicators should properly calibrate the degree of commitment they express in different beliefs. They should be particularly cautious when they are at risk of having false claims of knowledge and unfounded self-confidence be exposed. By contrast, when this is unlikely to happen, projecting an attitude of competence and epistemic confidence may benefit one's reputation (as does projecting a sense of self-confidence generally). Note that people need not engage in any strategic calculus in order to serve their reputation in this fine-grained way. In fact, some metacognitive mechanism may have evolved so as to produce the degree of self-confidence the sincere expression of which is most likely to contribute to one's reputation. Much of the knowledge illusion that Sloman and Fernbach so effectively demonstrate might result from such a metacognitive disposition.
As this rapid discussion, we hope, illustrates, The Knowledge Illusion not only does a great job of introducing its readers to important issues in current psychology, it is also thought-provoking and should stimulate further exciting research.
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